Erebus

September 11 · source record · report

A Review of the FBI's Handling of Intelligence Information Related to the September 11 Attacks

U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General · 2004

AI-verified citationSRC-DOJ-OIG-2004
identifier / locator
Special Report, November 2004; released publicly June 2006 (HTML chapters, no print pagination)
url
https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/archive/special/s0606/chapter3.htm
verification note
Chapters 3, 4, and 5 fetched live from oig.justice.gov 2026-08-26; key judgments quoted verbatim. The HTML edition carries no page numbers, so locators here are chapter and section only.
reliability notes
  • An internal inspector-general review — the government auditing itself, which is both its authority and its limit.
  • The 'significant intelligence failure' judgment in Chapter 3 refers to the FBI's analytical practice generally, not solely to the handling of the Phoenix communication; it is frequently narrowed in quotation.

Evidence drawn from this source

Supports· strongSEP-E025

The inspector general on analytical failure: 'a significant intelligence failure'

what the source states
"What we do know is that the FBI was not adequately analyzing information for the purpose of drawing conclusions and making predictions. This was a significant intelligence failure, which hindered the chances of the FBI being able to detect and prevent the September 11 attacks." On the two future hijackers: "In sum, we found individual and systemic failings in the FBI's handling of information regarding the Hazmi and Mihdhar matter. The FBI had at least five opportunities to learn about their presence in the United States and to seek to find them before September 11, 2001." And on the flight-school detention: "we did not find that any employees committed intentional misconduct, or violated established FBI policies or practices, or attempted to deliberately sabotage the Moussaoui case. But the performance of several individuals involved with the case was lacking."
what we infer
Documents the failure mode at each node in detail, and specifically finds no intentional misconduct where the complicity hypotheses would require it. Five missed opportunities on the same two men is the signature of an institution not connecting information, not of one protecting a plot.
limitations
  • An agency's inspector general reviewing that agency.
  • The 'significant intelligence failure' judgment addresses analytical practice generally and is frequently narrowed in quotation to a single episode.